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Whilst employment levels in Australia are healthy when compared to those twenty years ago, the
available work has become increasingly polarised into either all-work or no-work households.  This
paper measures the extent of polarisation that has taken place in Australia since 1982 with a measure
that accounts for changes in individual based employment and family structure. We find that
employment growth over the period should have largely offset the effects of shifts in household
composition towards more single-adult households. However, polarisation of employment across
households means that there are around 3.3 percent more households with no earned income. We also
find that couples with children have faced the bulk of this rising joblessness as a result of this
polarisation.  Exploration of wider shifts in employment away from less-educated men and toward
prime-age better educated women explain about 40% of the adverse shift against couples with children.
The increase in all-work households is confined to multi-adult households, again focused on families
with children. Hence, there is a large shift in patterns of employment in households with children, away
from a dominant single male earner model toward more dual-earner and no-earner households with
children.  This dramatic polarisation of work and incomes for families with children is likely to have
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Whilst employment levels in Australia are healthy when compared to those twenty years ago, 
the available work has become increasingly polarised into either all-work or no-work 
households.  This paper measures that extent of polarisation that has taken place in Australia 
between 1982 and 1997/98 with a measure of polarisation that accounts for changes in 
individual based employment.  Initially we measure the extent of polarisation against a 
benchmark of randomly distributed work and then extend this to account for varying 
employment rates across subgroups of the population.  We find that employment growth over 
the period should have largely offset the effects of shifts in household composition towards 
more single-adult households.  However, polarisation of employment across households 
means that there are around 3.3 percentage points more households with no earned income. 
The vast majority of the increase in polarisation is found to be within-household types and 
does not reflect shifts to household types where employment levels are traditionally low.  We 
also find that couple households with children are the dominant household type to see rising 
joblessness as a result of this polarisation.  Exploration of whether wider shifts in employment 
away from less-educated men and toward prime-age better educated women lie behind these 
developments suggest that about 40% of the adverse shift against couples with children and 
against this benchmark lone parents do much worse.  Lone parents have gained employment 
over this period at a faster rate than the average worker but are failing to keep up with prime 
age women who contribute to the growing number of couples where both adults work.   
Households renting privately are also particularly prone to the growing polarisation of work 
even after conditioning on varying employment prospects.  The increase in all-work 
households is confined to multi-adult households, again focused on families with children.  
Hence, there is a large shift in patterns of employment in households with children, away 
from a dominant single male earner model toward more dual-earner and no-earner (couple 
and single) households with children.  This dramatic polarisation of work and incomes for 
families with children is likely to have consequences for welfare costs and child opportunities 
in the next generation.  
1. Introduction 
Although aggregate employment rates across OECD countries have recovered from the 
recession lows of the 1980s, there has also been an upward trend in the number of jobless 
households in the majority of these nations (OECD, 1998). Thus, the aggregate 
unemployment rate, or employment rate based on individual data, may not fully capture the 
evolving economic and social impact of joblessness on families. Both Australian and overseas 
studies have shown that the burden of unemployment, or more generally joblessness, is 
concentrated in certain households (for eg. Dawkins, Gregg and Scutella, 2002; Dawkins, 
1996; Miller, 1997; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996a, 1996b and 2000; OECD, 1998; Gregory, 
1999). Furthermore this concentration has become more pronounced, so that there has been a 
switch away from those not in work being supported by other family members toward whole 
households being jobless and being largely supported by the State (Dawkins, Gregg and 
Scutella, 2002 or Whiteford, 2000). Alongside this studies have found that there has been an 
increase in all-work households (for eg. Dawkins, 1996 and Gregory, 1999).
1 Thus, 
employment is becoming increasingly polarised into all-work households and no-work 
households. 
Increasing employment concentration within households has a direct impact on inequality and 
poverty with seventy per cent of jobless households with incomes in the lowest quintile (see 
OECD, 1998 and Dawkins, Gregg and Scutella, 2002). Even more worrying is that over 
seventy four per cent of jobless households with children are in the poorest quintile. The aim 
of this paper is to examine the changing distribution of employment and determine what has 
contributed to this uneven dispersion of employment towards households in society who 
already receive earnings, leaving others jobless and essentially dependent on government 
support. We wish to establish the relative contribution of aggregate changes in employment, 
household composition and the changing distribution of work for given household types in 
driving this phenomenon. Then to assess how wider shifts in patterns of employment by 
gender, age, education, region and immigrant arrival status relate to jobless households.  
                                                 
1 As overseas studies concentrate on the household as opposed to the family or the income unit we similarly 
focus on the household for comparative purposes. In most analyses of poverty the household is used as the unit 
of measurement to allow for possible intra-household transfers. 
  1The relationship between individual unemployment (non-employment) and household 
circumstances has changed sharply over the last 15 years or so, which has ramifications for 
welfare support costs and poverty. The recent McClure Report on Welfare Reform (Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform, 2000a and 2000b) emphasised that the growth in jobless 
households and families over the last two decades was a major motivation for their 
recommendations, and that substantially reducing the number of jobless households and 
families should be one of three targets for reform. A second target was to reduce substantially 
the number of people who rely heavily on income support. A substantial reduction in jobless 
families would also impact on the second target.  
The McClure Report emphasised that reducing jobless families would not only be a major 
improvement for society at the time, it could be expected to have positive inter-generational 
effects. McClelland, MacDonald and MacDonald (1998) state that there is evidence to suggest 
that the likelihood of a young person completing secondary school and finding secure 
employment is affected by their parent’s socio-economic background. Longitudinal social 
security data show that, between the ages of 16 and 18, young people from income support 
recipient families are much more likely than other young people to become parents at an early 
age, leave school early, receive income support and be highly income support reliant 
themselves (Pech and McCoull, 1999). For all of these outcomes but the first, the risk is 
highest for young people whose parents have received income support continuously for at 
least two years.  
In earlier work we examined the relationship between household and individual joblessness 
and patterns across certain demographic groups in some detail (see Dawkins et al. 2002). 
Here, we focus more formally on analysing this observed divergence between individual and 
household measures of joblessness in Australia. We use a measure of the polarisation of 
employment derived from the observed deviation from a benchmark world where the 
available work is randomly distributed across all working age adults. This measure was 
proposed by Gregg and Wadsworth (2001) and following them we extend this approach to 
allow for variations in employment rates across various subgroups of the population.   
This paper finds that joblessness has become concentrated in particular households, especially 
households with children. This has been so strong that jobless households have become more 
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prominent while employment levels increased. Part of the explanation, for the growth in 
jobless households, lies in the changing structure of households. In particular there has been a 
household compositional shift towards single-adult households, both with and without 
children.  Of at least equal importance however, has been the polarisation of employment 
within-household types.  Indeed, a large majority of the polarisation of employment within-
household types is found within two-adult (couple) households, particularly those with 
children. Nearly two thirds of the increase in polarisation for households of a given size 
comes from couples with children.  
Relaxing the random distribution of employment assumption and allowing for varying 
employment rates across the key subgroups of the population by which employment is known 
to vary, shows that the shifts in employment across these groups goes part of the way in 
explaining the concentration of joblessness within certain households, especially for couples. 
However, even after conditioning for characteristics there remains an unexplained component. 
This is most pronounced for couple households with children and for households renting 
privately. In conjunction with this, we also find an increase in the all-work household rate also 
almost entirely emanating from couples and again focused on couples with children. Hence, 
the employment circumstances of families with children have born the brunt of employment 
polarisation. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. A description of the data used in the analysis is 
provided in Section 2. Section 3 presents a summary of the patterns and trends in the 
incidence of jobless families between 1982 and 1997/98 while Section 4 presents the method 
and results of measuring the polarisation of employment in Australia looking at jobless 
households. Households facing particular disincentives to offer labour supply at the lower end 
of the income distribution, households with children and households in private rental 
property, are the focus of our attention in Section 5. Attention is diverted to the other end of 
the distribution of work to that of all-work households in Section 6. Concluding comments 
and policy implications are offered in Section 7. 
  32.  Data: Survey of Income and Housing Costs and Income Distribution Surveys 
The Australian Survey of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC) has been conducted since 
1994/95 as part of the Monthly Population Survey and contains detailed unit record data on 
the composition of income and housing costs both at the income unit level and at the person 
level. Around 650 households are surveyed monthly. Prior to 1994 similar information was 
collected as part of the Income Distribution Survey (IDS) which was conducted at four yearly 
intervals over 3 months in the second half of the year.  
Demographic characteristics of each person of workforce age in each income unit are 
recorded, including: age, sex, marital status, country of birth, number of dependent children 
and age of youngest child. Other characteristics recorded include: dwelling type and structure, 
tenure type, current weekly rent paid and current weekly loan repayments of each income 
unit, employment status, labour force status, highest educational qualification, weekly hours 
of work, occupation and industry in main job, duration of unemployment, current weekly 
earned and unearned income from various sources and annual income from each source in 
previous financial year. Income sources are detailed and include income from wages and 
salary, property and interest, social security allowances and pensions, superannuation and 
other regular sources. The ease of access to the unit record data and the detail of both personal 
and household characteristics in the surveys are the definite strengths of using the SIHC and 
IDS. While the Labour Force Survey undertaken by the ABS gives a longer time series, the 
unit record data is not publicly available therefore published tables need to be relied on which 
makes it less flexible to use. It also lacks details of individual and household income. 
Alternatively Census data is available, which was used by Miller (1997), however this data is 
far less frequent and thus inadequate when examining trends over short to medium term time 
frames. It also only provides income information at the household level, which is then only 
available in income ranges. Thus, for any distributional or poverty analysis Census data has 
its limits. Since 1994 the SIHC has been conducted on an annual basis. Prior to this the IDS 
were conducted at four yearly intervals. At present there are unit record data for the following 
years: 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994/95, 1995/96, 1996/97 and 1997/98. The resulting sample of 
households were 6819, 7112, 7402 and 7171 over the 1994/95, 1995/96, 1996/97 and 1997/98 
financial years respectively whilst in 1982, 1986 and 1990 the sample of households were 
14925, 8514 and 14669 respectively. 
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This analysis refers to adults as individuals of working age not in full-time study where 
working age is defined as 15-64 years for males and 15-59 years for females. We refer to the 
reference person (or head of household in the 1982 and 1986 IDS data) as the nominated head 
of household. Note that the ABS definition of a reference person/head of household is the 
male partner in a couple household, the parent in a lone parent household and the person in a 
single person household. Full-time students are excluded as their economic inactivity is a 
productive investment in their future and thus does not reflect the same degree of social 
distress or exclusion. Likewise, and for similar reasons, households with heads of retirement 
age are also excluded. Note that the early retired are included in the analysis. Dependent 
children are defined as all children less than 15 years plus full-time students under the age of 
18 years. We choose to depart from the current ABS definition of dependents, as we prefer to 
focus on households with children rather than including dependents that are adults not in full-
time education (as noted above, students are excluded). Note that as we only include the 
working-age non-student population there may be differences in the information presented in 
this analysis and other published statistics.  
3.  Summary of the Incidence and Trends in Jobless Households 
Previous studies have shown an increase in the incidence of both unemployed households 
(Miller, 1997) and jobless households (Dawkins et al 2002; Dawkins, 1996; and Gregory, 
1999) over the last two decades in Australia. The following section provides an overview of 
the extent of the divergence between individual based measures of joblessness and household 
based measures in Australia.  A jobless household is defined as a household where no 
working-age adult is employed
2. Thus, household members in a jobless household can be 
either unemployed or not in the labour force.  
3.1. Aggregate  Incidence 
Table 1 shows the aggregate employment rate (the individual non-employment or jobless rate 
is then calculated as one hundred minus the employment rate) and the overall incidence of 
jobless households from 1982 to 1997/98.  





















 %  %  %  %  % 
1982 70.4 15.4  12.7  9.5  10.2 
1986 71.9 14.9  14.9  10.8 11.5 
1990 74.2 15.8  14.2  10.5 11.4 
1994/95 73.1  20.4  15.5  11.8  14.2 
1995/96 74.3  20.9  15.1  11.2  12.9 
1996/97 72.8  22.9  16.8  12.3  15.6 
1997/98 73.7  21.3  16.3  12.1  15.0 
a)  Benefits included as major Income Support Payments are unemployment benefits 
(Unemployment Benefit, Job Search Allowance, Newstart Allowance, Mature Age Allowance 
and Youth Training Allowance), sole parent benefits (Supporting Parents Benefit, Sole 
Parents Benefit and Sole Parent Pension) and disability payments (War Disability Pension, 
Invalid Pension, DVA Disability Pension and Disability Support Pension). 
Aggregate employment recovered between 1982 and 1990 after the early 80s recession. Since 
then it has remained broadly unchanged. By contrast, there has been a near continuous growth 
in the overall incidence of jobless households, from 12.7 per cent in 1982 to 16.3 per cent in 
1997/98. This rise in jobless households mirrors the increasing number of households where a 
member is claiming one of the three major income support payments (unemployment, 
disability and lone parenthood). Here there may be an earner present and so the rates are 
higher than the associated jobless household rates. The Reference Group on Welfare Reform 
noted that between 1986 and 1996 the proportion of workforce-age income units with at least 
90% of their income from government cash payments rose from 11.9 to 14.1% (Reference 
Group on Welfare Reform, 2000c, p.28). Again this was a period over which employment 
rose. So the rise in jobless households is mirrored in terms of rising welfare dependency. 
Table 1 also shows the proportions of working-age adults and the proportion of dependent 
children in jobless households. Both of these have also risen over the period, with the 
proportion of dependent children in jobless households rising at a notably faster rate. The 
                                                                                                                                                          
2 Labour force status classifications used in ABS statistics correspond to those set out by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) and the United Nations Statistical Office.  
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proportion of children in jobless households rose by 5 percentage points to 15 percent (or 
nearly 50% above its 1982 level).  Labour force data published by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (1999) suggests that the upward trend in the number of children living in jobless 
families may have continued over recent years with about 860,000 (17.4 per cent) dependent 
children living in jobless households in June 1999
3.   
Figures 1 and 2 place Australia in the international context. These draw on the data published 
by the OECD (OECD, 1998). The OECD estimates of jobless households for Australia (using 
Labour Force Survey data) in 1996 match ours closely, at over 16%. Australia in this data has 
a lower share of households that were jobless than is common in most developed nations but 
perhaps the most striking feature is just how little variation there is given the wide variations 
in employment patterns. This commonality disappears however, when households with 
children are considered. Here Australia, along with other English speaking countries other 
than the US, has an unusually high incidence of children growing up in households with no 
adult working. Only the UK and Ireland have larger proportions of children in jobless 
households and this is also true if single parent or couple households are considered 
separately. The OECD study also explored changes between 1985 and 1996, many OECD 
countries, including Australia, experienced rising shares of jobless households whilst 
employment also rose.  This implies that the available work is going to other households and 
indeed in Australia the share of households where all adults work has risen from 49% in 1982 
to 59% in 1997. Dawkins, Gregg and Scutella (2002) highlight how the vast majority, 70%, of 
jobless household have incomes in the lowest quintile and this is even higher for families with 
children. Furthermore, they highlight how most of these households do not contain an 
unemployed adult, which suggests a widespread and growing absence of any labour supply in 
Australian working-age households.  
 
                                                 
3 In the labour force data dependent children are defined as children under 15 plus dependent students aged 15-
24. 




































Figure 2: Jobless household rate by country for households with children  



































Table 2 outlines the shifting circumstances of the jobless household population. Jobless 
households in the table are captured in the first category they fall under. Therefore, the first 
column reports the proportion of jobless working-age households where there is an 
unemployed person resident, with the second column reporting the proportion of lone-parent 
jobless households who are not represented in the unemployed category, the third the 
proportion with a permanently unable to work member who are not represented in columns 
one or two, and so on.  Households with an unemployed person are offering labour supply but 
are perhaps constrained (even if only temporarily) by a lack of opportunities in the labour 
market. Here we see that the full impact of the early eighties recession had not yet fed through 
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to unemployment rates in 1982 and as such the proportion of jobless households with an 
unemployed resident only fell slightly by 1986, with an overall increase between 1982 and 
1990.  This then fell after the early nineties recession, tapering off to remain fairly steady over 
the mid to late nineties. This is coupled with quite a significant and consistent increase in the 
proportion of the unemployed resident in jobless households. Thus although the proportion of 
jobless households with an unemployed member does not change significantly over the 
general period, the unemployed have become increasingly concentrated in jobless households 
(see Dawkins, Gregg and Scutella, 2002).  
























1982 31.3  15.3  0.7  40.3  12.4  518,324 
1986 29.2  17.2  0.3  41.5  11.8  641,127 
1990 36.9  16.1  1.0  36.3  9.7  649,466 
1994/95 35.8 16.5 2.5 35.1  10.2  751,886 
1995/96 32.9 18.6 2.2 31.8  14.5  754,398 
1996/97 32.5 20.2 2.6 32.7  12.1  821,939 
1997/98 32.5 17.7 3.7 32.6  13.5  819,442 
a)  Note that the table reads with jobless households represented in the first category they fall 
under. That is the first column reports the proportion of jobless working-age households where 
there is an unemployed person resident, the second column the proportion of lone-parent jobless 
households who are not represented in the unemployed category, the third the proportion with a 
permanently unable to work member who are not represented in columns one or two, and so on. 
With unemployment being increasingly concentrated in certain households, the majority of 
jobless households are not offering labour supply. Columns 2 to 5 of Table 2 show the 
changing characteristics of households not offering any labour supply. Lone parents not in the 
labour force increase slightly over the period, while the proportion of jobless households with 
a person resident who is permanently unable to work has consistently risen over the period
4. 
                                                 
4 The question in the surveys enabling identification of those permanently unable to work changed between the 
Income Distribution Surveys and the Income and Housing Costs Surveys therefore we expect that part of the 
rise between the proportions in this category between 1990 and 1994/95 was due to this. However, we still 
expect the increasing prominence of households in this category to be apparent.   
  9Early retirement does not seem to be a significant factor in explaining the increase in the 
jobless household rate as the proportion of jobless households with a member over 50 years 
and not in any of the other jobless categories actually declines over the period. Labour Force 
data also shows us that the trend towards early retirement for males actually stabilised in the 
early 1980s, which is when our data begins, therefore we would not expect that this early 
retirement trend would explain much of the increase in the jobless household rate over this 
period.  
Thus, the key point from this table is the stability in the primary source of joblessness within 
these households. While the permanently unable to work group has clearly increased, they 
remain a very small portion of the jobless population. 
If increasing household joblessness has its origins in changes in household structure toward 
units where labour supply has always been low then policy makers may need to look at trends 
in family break-up and household formation as explanations of the rise in jobless households 
rather than on labour market opportunities and constraints on members of these households. 
Table 3 looks at the changes in household composition over the period. Presented in the table 
are the relative shares of each household type within all households with working-age adults 
over the period of interest with the final row showing the change in the composition between 
the start and end period.  
There have been clear shifts in the pattern of household composition with a 10 percentage 
point increase in the share of households containing only one adult, with corresponding 
declines in the share of both two and three plus adult households. If we disaggregate 
household types further to differentiate by the presence of children we find that single-adult 
households without children account for the majority of the rise in one-adult households 
rather than lone parents. General changes in the size of households have translated through to 
the composition of households that are jobless as is seen in Table 4. As a result of move 
towards smaller households, one-adult households now make up approximately 60% of all 
jobless households. Of course, larger households make up a much larger share of the 
population living in jobless households. One-adult households contain only around 40 per 
cent of working-age adults living in jobless households and contain around half of children in 
such households. 
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Table 3: Change in household size, 1982-1997/98 (shares of all households containing 
working-age adults) 
  1 adult  2 adults  3+adults  Total 
1982 19.2  62.2  18.7  100 
1986 23.6  59.6  16.8  100 
1990 23.2  61.4  15.4  100 
1994/95 26.3  58.6  15.2  100 
1995/96 28.7  56.5  14.7  100 
1996/97 28.4  56.4  15.2  100 
1997/98 29.1  56.1  14.8  100 
        
∆ 1982-97/98 9.9  -6.1 -3.9   
 
Table 4: Share of jobless households in household type, 1982-1997/98 
  1 adult  2 adults  3+adults  Total 
1982 53.0  41.5  5.5  100 
1986 60.2  35.8  4.0  100 
1990 59.0  37.2  3.8  100 
1994/95 56.8  38.9  4.3  100 
1995/96 62.8  33.8  3.5  100 
1996/97 63.0  32.8  4.2  100 
1997/98 61.7  35.1  3.2  100 
        
∆ 1982-97/98 8.7  -6.4 -2.3   
 
4.  Measuring the Polarisation of Employment  
The previous sections show that since 1982, while employment rates have risen, there has 
been a substantial shift toward smaller households and a rise in the number of jobless 
households. We want to be able to address how the growing amount of work is distributed 
across the increasing number of households and to look for evidence of polarisation of work 
across households. There is a natural analogy with inequality measures for the distribution of 
income. However, a person’s employment position is a discrete measure and standard 
inequality measures such as Gini coefficients are designed for continuous data. To explore the 
  11distribution of work across households we want a measure that is intuitive and can be 
decomposed in a way that allows identification of the origins of any developments. Gregg and 
Wadsworth (2001) suggest exploring the deviation from a benchmark of random distribution 
of available work across individuals. So that for an employment rate of 75%,  1 in 4 
individuals would be jobless if work were randomly distributed. For single-adult households 
then the individual and household jobless rate is the same and 1 in 4 will have no work for 
this benchmark. Likewise, assuming independence, a couple will have a 1 in 16 chance of 
being workless. So if n is the aggregate jobless rate for the population the probability of a 
household with i adults being jobless at time t is given by, 
i
it t p n =          ( 1 )  
Now taking a weighted average of these rates across household types, with the weights given 
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So for a given employment level and family structure we get a prediction of the share of 
households with no or all adults in work if being in employment is a random state. Over time, 
this gives a decomposition of whether changes are down to changes in the predicted rate, 
which contains changing family structure and employment levels, or shifts in the extent that 
work is polarised across households. Polarisation is the deviation in the number of jobless or 
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There is said to be negative polarisation where there are fewer than predicted jobless 
households. This would occur in the traditional family if one adult works in paid employment 
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whilst another, normally the woman, produces within the home. Positive polarisation is where 
there are more jobless or all working households that would occur from a random distribution 
of work. These calculations can be replicated for each household size in order to see which 
types have experienced the greatest proportion of the polarisation. An alternative 
representation is to describe polarisation as the actual jobless household rate relative to the 
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Table 5 provides the measures of polarisation using these methods.  















1982 12.67  11.46  1.20  1.11 
1986 14.88  11.62  3.26  1.28 
1990 14.2  10.26  3.94  1.38 
1994/95 15.48  11.55  3.93  1.34 
1995/96 15.11  11.31  3.80  1.34 
1996/97 16.77  12.14  4.63  1.38 
1997/98 16.28  11.75  4.53  1.39 
        
∆ 1982-97/98 3.61  0.29  3.33  0.28 
Presented in the first column are the jobless household rates actually observed in Australia 
between 1982 and 1997/98. Taking the available stock of employment and randomly 
assigning it across individuals gives the predicted jobless household rates presented in the 
second column. The penultimate column presents our measure of polarisation, which is the 
difference between the two, and shows the deviation of the actual jobless household rate from 
a world where employment is randomly distributed across the working-age population. The 
relative measure of polarisation is presented in the final column of the table.  
  13The predicted jobless household rate is driven by employment levels and the evolving family 
structure of households whilst the polarisation term measures the evolving deviation of the 
actual number of jobless households from that consistent with a random distribution of work 
across all working-age adults (which is also driven in part by relative shares of each 
household type).  In 1982, the observed number of jobless households was only marginally 
higher than that predicted by a benchmark of randomly distributed work. There was thus little 
observed polarisation on this measure. Since then the predicted jobless household rate has 
broadly remained flat and the majority of the observed rise in workless households is 
attributable to the polarisation of work across households.  
So since 1982 the predicted jobless household rate, given employment levels and household 
structure, has increased only fractionally by 0.3 percentage points. But the observed rate has 
increased by far more leading to a 3.3 point increase in measured polarisation. Using the 
relative measure, this equates to there being 40% more jobless households than predicted by 
the random distribution benchmark in 1997-98, up from 10% in 1982. Since 1982, 
polarisation has risen reasonably continuously, but the bulk of the deviation occurred prior to 
1990. 
4.1.  Exploring Changes Over Time 
The predicted jobless household rate is driven by changes in individual employment rates and 
general changes in household composition. For instance if there is a general move towards 
smaller households, this will be picked up by our predicted jobless household rate. Likewise, 
polarisation need not be equal for all household sizes and so changes in household shares will 
also affect our measure of polarisation if there are moves toward household types that are 
traditionally more likely to be jobless (for instance lone parent households). Basic shift-share 
analysis can be used to decompose the predicted jobless household rate and our measure of 
polarisation to separate out these effects.  
We now proceed to decompose changes over time in both the predicted and polarisation 
measures in order to explore the source of any disturbance. To examine the change in the 
predicted workless household rate over time, we follow Gregg and Wadsworth (2001) and use 
a shift-share breakdown adapting the decomposition slightly to take account of developments 
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presented in Shorrocks (1999), which eliminate the need for a residual, or interaction, term. 
The change in the predicted jobless household rate between any two-time periods can thus be 
decomposed into: 
00 ˆ () / 2 ( ( ) / 2 )
ii i
t it t it t i it t ii i ws n s n n s s ∆= ∆ = ∆ + + + ∆ ∑∑ ∑
i n
i
   (5) 
where the two terms capture the impact of changes in family structure taking the average 
employment rate over the base period and end period, and changes in aggregate employment 
taking the average household share over the base and end period, respectively. Hence, 
between any two dates, the predicted component can be attributed to changes in family 
structure and changes in labour market performance as measured by the aggregate 
employment rate.  
Polarisation need not be equal for all household sizes and so changes in household shares will 
also affect our measure of polarisation if there are moves toward household types with a high 
propensity to be jobless (e.g. single-adult households) this is likely to increase measured 
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where the first term is the between-household type component and the second term measures 
the within-household type component of the observed polarisation.  This tells us whether the 
change in polarisation is due to shifts in household structure towards family types who tend to 
have lower employment probabilities than their predicted benchmark, (term 1 on the right 
hand side of (5)), or due to employment opportunities worsening amongst all family types, 
(term 2). Term 2 can also be split into whether the within-household component is strongest 
amongst single-adult or multi-adult households. These results of these decompositions are 
presented in Table 6.  
  15Table 6:  Decomposition of Changes in Predicted Jobless Household Rates and 
Polarisation, 1982 to 1997/98 




























1982-1997 0.3  2.3  -2.0  3.3  0.5  2.8 
          
1982-1990 -1.2  1.0  -2.2  2.7  0.3  2.5 
1990-1997  1.5 1.2 0.3 0.6  0.4  0.2 
 
The first column of the table presents the change in the predicted jobless household rate over 
the entire period, and then over each decade separately. The second and third columns present 
the results of the decomposition of the predicted rate with the contribution that changes in 
household composition and employment have on predicted joblessness across households if 
employment were randomly assigned. The apparent stability in the predicted jobless 
household rate is actually the result of two offsetting developments, rising employment 
between 1982 and 1997/98 would, every thing else held equal, reduce the number of jobless 
households by 2 percentage points. While an underlying trend in household structure toward 
more single-adult households has an opposite effect of broadly the same magnitude. The 
timing of these developments is such that the number of jobless households should have fallen 
in the 1980s through the strong employment recovery but have risen in the 1990s from 
changing household structure. 
Changes in employment polarisation are presented in column 4 of Table 6 with the between-
household type and within-household type decompositions in columns 5 and 6 respectively. 
Columns 4 to 6 make clear that movements toward more single-adult households exert a very 
modest upward pressure on the measure of polarisation, with 85% of the rise in polarisation 
coming from an increased propensity for joblessness within-household types. Also shown in 
the table is that, while it seems that the majority of the employment polarisation across 
households occurred primarily in the 1980s, changes in household structure were more 
pronounced in the 1990s. Table 7 makes clear why this is the case by looking at the measured 
polarisation for each household size.  
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Table 7: Actual and Predicted Jobless Household Rates by Household Size, 1982 to 
1997/98 
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Per cent 
1982  35.1  29.6  5.5  8.5 8.7  -0.2  3.7 2.0  1.7 
1986  38.0  28.1  9.9 8.9  7.9 1.0 3.5  1.7 1.8 
1990  36.1  25.8  10.3  8.6  6.7 1.9 3.5  1.3 2.2 
1994/95  33.5 26.9  6.6  10.3 7.3 3 4.3  1.5  2.8 
1995/96  33.0  25.7  7.3 9.0  6.6 2.4 3.6  1.3 2.3 
1996/97  37.1  27.2  9.9 9.8  7.4 2.4 4.7  1.5 3.2 
1997/98  34.5  26.3  8.2  10.2  6.9 3.3 3.6  1.4 2.2 
                
∆ 1982-97/98  -0.6  -3.3 2.7 1.7  -1.8 3.5 -0.1  -0.6 0.5 
In 1982 there were slightly fewer workless couples than would occur from a random 
distribution of work among adults, whilst single-adult households were somewhat more 
susceptible to being without work. But between 1982 and 1997 the share of single-adult 
households without work diminished slightly whilst joblessness rose for couples. Taking into 
account the general improvement in the employment situation both single-adult households 
and couples saw sharp increases between the actual shares that were without a worker against 
the benchmark of that predicted by a random distribution of the available work amongst 
working age adults. This polarisation is actually slightly more acute for couples with a little 
under a 4 percentage point increase than singles with a 3 point rise. As couples are the most 
common household type in the population it is clear that the increased polarisation of work 
comes mainly amongst two-adult households (couples). This is examined further below.  
Figure 3 summarises the information presented in Table 6 and looks at the relative 
contribution of each household type in driving the polarisation within-household types.  
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At the top of the diagram the actual and predicted jobless household rates in 1982 and 
1997/98 and the polarisation estimated are presented. The change between the start and end 
period are also presented. The next level of the diagram shows the results of the 
decompositions of the predicted jobless household rate and of the measured polarisation 
respectively, with the numbers in brackets referring to the contributions of each component in 
percentage terms. We then go one step further and show the contribution that each household 
type has on the polarisation found within-household types, again with the number in brackets 
referring to the contribution in percentage terms.  
Decomposing the predicted jobless household rate tells us that the increase in single-adult 
households assuming employment is distributed randomly would, given employment levels in 
1982, have lead to a 2.3 point increase in the jobless household rate. As single-adult 
households, particularly those with children, traditionally have employment rates lower than 
those predicted by a random distribution of employment, a shift towards smaller households 
would also lead to a 0.5 point increase in employment polarisation (this is the between-
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household component of the decomposition). So moves toward smaller households with 
traditionally weak employment chances are of a roughly equal magnitude to the within-
household type polarisation effect, with both adding about 2.8 percentage points to the jobless 
household rate. Examining the relative contribution of each household type to the polarisation 
found within-household types we find that three quarters of the polarisation comes from two-
adult households (couples). Further decomposing this by differentiating household types by 
the presence of children suggests that 65% of the within-group polarisation affects couples 
with children. We examine this more fully later.  
Table 8 and Figure 4 use the data published by the OECD, (OECD, 1998) to apply this 
methodology internationally and to look at Australia’s standing in the world.  
Table 8: Polarisation by country, 1996 
   Workless 
household 
rate    w
Predicted 
  ˆ w
Absolute 
Polarisation 
  ˆ () ww −
Relative 
Polarisation, 









Australia 16.3  12.9  3.4  1.26  1.4  0.11 
Belgium 24.8  21.3  3.5  1.16  3.7  0.17 
Canada 19.9  16.5  3.4  1.21  2.6  0.16 
France 21.9  20.1  1.8  1.09  1.0  0.05 
Germany 20.7  18.0  2.7  1.15  0.6  0.04 
Greece 20.1  19.2  1.9  1.05  1.2  0.06 
Ireland 20.4  20.3  0.1  1.00  3.8  0.16 
Italy 20.7  22.8  -2.1  0.91  1.4  0.08 
Luxembourg 16.4  19.7  -3.3  0.83  -0.3  0.00 
Netherlands 19.7  16.3 3.4 1.21  2.5  0.16 
Portugal 13.3  12.0  1.3  1.11  -0.2  -0.03 
Spain 20.0  22.9  -2.9  0.87  0.1  0.01 
United Kingdom  21.6  14.1  7.5  1.53  1.3  0.08 
United States  15.4  15.5  -0.1  0.99  0.5  0.03 
Source: adapted from Table 9 in Gregg and Wadsworth (2000) 





















































































































Australia has measured polarisation that places it as one of three countries in the second rank 
behind the UK, along with Canada and Belgium. In the UK, Canada and Australia the 
relatively high employment rates do not as effectively reduce jobless households as compared 
to other countries. This makes using a relative benchmark even more marked and on this 
measure Australian polarisation is second only to the UK. Over the period 1985-96, which 
was used by the OECD, polarisation increased in most OECD countries (Portugal and 
Luxembourg the only exceptions). Australia was in the middle grouping of countries with 
moderate increases in polarisation, along with France, Italy and the UK.   
Individual Characteristics 
The observed polarisation within-household types may be just a representation of a 
polarisation in another dimension. If household members have similar characteristics then 
inequalities in labour market opportunities along the lines of these characteristics will bring a 
coincident polarisation by household. The most obvious is by region, for all household 
members reside at the same address then if that is an area of low employment, all household 
members are likely to have a lower propensity to be in work. In the context of couples the 
process by which members share common characteristics is called assortative mating. This 
kind of ‘assortative mating’ would tend to make joblessness concentrated on particular 
households if joblessness is more apparent in certain sections of the population. With female 
participation rates rising and male participation rates falling, it is quite likely that some of the 
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observed polarisation may be due to assortative mating becoming more apparent. This effect 
will be strengthened if employment opportunities have worsened for certain groups in the 
population while improving for others, and the disadvantaged groups live in the same 
household. For instance demand for less skilled employment may have fallen with an increase 
in demand for high skilled employment. With less skilled males more likely to be married to 
less skilled females, and high skilled males more likely to be married to high skilled females, 
this will have a significant effect on employment polarisation. 
To explore whether there is any indication of a change in assortative mating by education over 
the period the correlation between the age of head of household and spouse and between the 
education of head of household and spouse are presented in Table 9.  
Table 9: Correlation between age and education of head of household and spouse, 1982 
to 1997/98 
 Correlation  coefficients 
 Age  Education 
1982 0.9277  0.2964 
1986 0.9176  0.3324 
1990 0.9109  0.3571 
1994/95 0.9073  0.3693 
1995/96 0.9074  0.3728 
1996/97 0.9010  0.3787 
1997/98 0.9079  0.3684 
While assortative mating by age has remained relatively unchanged over the years, couples 
were more likely to marry those with an equivalent educational qualification in 1997/98 than 
they were in 1982. Due to changes in educational classifications across certain years, 
individuals were categorised in one of three education groups: university qualification, other 
qualification or no qualification. As those with no qualifications are more likely to be out of 
work, a rise in assortative mating by education is consistent with an increase in the jobless 
household rate. However, the increase in the correlation between educational qualification of 
nominated head of household and spouse may be an artefact of the changing marginal 
distribution of educational qualifications. Examining the changing distribution of educational 
qualifications of heads of households and their spouses over the period we find evidence to 
suggest that the increased correlation is due almost entirely to a growing propensity for the 
  21increasing number of graduates to be paired together. Thus, the large increase in those with 
university educations, especially among women, is a significant factor in explaining the 
increasing correlation over time. 
We also explored the correlation coefficient for age. This is quite high as members of couples 
are generally in the same age bracket but the correlation is roughly stable with a slight fall 
over the 1982-1997/98 period, suggesting that couples are no more likely to marry individuals 
of their age bracket in 1997/98 than they were in 1982.  
To explore the importance of common characteristics on employment polarisation, we relax 
the assumption of work being randomly distributed across all working-age adults by allowing 
the predicted individual non-employment rates to vary by gender, age, qualifications and 
region. This allows us to see whether the major shifts in the pattern of employment across 
regions, skill and age groups over the last twenty years lie behind the observed polarisation of 
work. Since the predicted rate,  , is now based on the average non-employment rate in 
group k, the predicted and actual rates for group k will converge the more disaggregated the 
population on which   is based.  The degree of disaggregation used is, of course, arbitrary 
but does allow us to look at the major factors over which employment is known to vary. This 
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The extent that this count differs from the measure introduced in (5) is attributable to 
changing variation in employment across groups and any residual polarisation from (7) can be 
said to be conditional polarisation. Note that if employment dispersion across any observable 
population type lies behind the divergence between actual and predicted measures then 
disaggregating by this variable should reduce polarisation relative to the unconditional case.  
Since the average actual rate at any point in time,  ikt ikt ik sw ∑ , is unchanged by disaggregation, 
the better the prediction, ∑ , the lower the polarisation measure.  
i
ikt kt ik sn
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This helps clarify the extent to which polarisation rises if either (a) multi-adult household 
members have common characteristics across which employment varies substantially or (b) 
single-adult households have characteristics which are associated with low employment 
probabilities. Having accounted for a set of observable characteristics, any residual 
polarisation, which we call conditional polarisation, would suggest that jobless households 
form because all members of certain households suffer reduced access to work relative to 
others with similar characteristics.  
We focus on characteristics over which employment varies widely in the population and are 
weakly exogenous to the individual. Characteristics such as housing tenure or neighbourhood 
of residence may well be influenced by current or past joblessness and are therefore not 
included. It is of course possible, indeed probable, that current or past joblessness influences 
household structure. Joblessness may well put families under greater stress and lead to a 
greater incidence of break up. In this way household size may be influenced by observed or 
unobserved personal characteristics. Given the static nature of our data we do not explore this 
as we treat household structure as weakly exogenous to events we describe.  
The characteristics we use to differentiate between varying employment rates are region (4 
groups: NSW, ACT and NT; Victoria and Tasmania; Queensland; WA and South Australia)
5, 
capital city, gender, age (4 groups; 15-24 years, 25-34 years, 35 to 49 years and 50 years 
plus), education (3 groups; university education, other post secondary and no post secondary) 
and we also differentiate for recent arrivals. Recent arrivals are defined to be all arrivals 
during and after 1970 in the 1982 and 1986 surveys, all arrivals during and after 1975 for the 
1990 survey and all arrivals during and after 1981 for the 1994/95 to 1997/98 surveys. To 
predict the jobless household rate we then use one characteristic at a time and then combine, 
see Table 10. 
                                                 
5 Ideally we would like to be able to differentiate employment rates by individual States but as sample sizes 
become very small when we do this across the combined set of variables, particularly for the smaller States, 
we are constrained to aggregate across certain States. At this stage we have aggregated across States in a fairly 
arbitrary fashion which we understand is not desirably as there are quite substantial difference in employment 
rates across the States and the Territories, however in future work we will look into using propensity score 
matching to get around the cell size problem. 
  23Table 10: Comparison of actual vs. predicted jobless household rates, 1982 to 1997/98 
  Predicted jobless household rate 













1982 12.7  11.5  10.1  12.0  11.2  11.5  11.5  11.5  10.2 
1986 14.9  11.6  10.6  12.3  11.4  11.6  n.a.  11.6  11.0 
1990 14.2  10.2  9.7  10.8  10.1  10.2  10.3  10.2  10.1 
1994/95 15.5  11.6 10.9  12.0  11.4  11.6  11.6  11.6  11.1 
1995/96 15.1  11.3 10.8  11.5  11.1  11.3  11.3  11.3  10.9 
1996/97 16.8  12.1 11.6  12.4  12.1  12.1  12.2  12.1  11.8 
1997/98 16.3  11.8 11.2  12.0  11.7  11.8  11.8  11.7  11.5 
∆ 97/98-82 3.6  0.3  1.1  0.0  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.2  1.3 
 
Actual jobless household rates over the period between 1982 and 1997/98 are presented in 
Table 10 alongside the predicted jobless household rate, initially assuming employment is 
distributed randomly in the second column and then allowing employment to vary across 
gender, age, education, region, capital city and whether a recently arrived migrant in columns 
3 to 8 respectively. Allowing employment rates to vary across all of these combined 
characteristics generates the predicted jobless household rates presented in the final column. 
Our initial, or unconditional, measure of polarisation is estimated by taking the absolute 
difference between the actual and predicted jobless household rates presented in the first two 
columns.  Any unexplained, or conditional, polarisation is estimated by taking the difference 
between the actual jobless household rate and the predicted jobless household rate allowing 
employment to vary across our combined set of characteristics presented in the final column 
of the table.  
The table shows that allowing employment to vary by gender and education increases the 
predicted change in the jobless household rate. The other factors add relatively little when 
taken individually. Allowing for gender variations actually lowers the predicted jobless 
household rates but does so more for 1982. Back then fewer women worked and male 
employment rates were higher. As most couples contain a man and a woman then allowing 
for gender differences predicts fewer jobless households. Since then employment has risen for 
women and fallen for men and this effect has become less pronounced. Taken with the 
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educational changes this suggests that less educated men are losing employment while better-
educated women are gaining and these groups tend to live in different households. Appendix 
1 presents the individual based employment rates for each characteristic we control for. In 
combination these employment changes raise the predicted increase by around 1 percentage 
point, so even after conditioning two thirds of the polarisation remains. As was noted earlier, 
male employment and labour force participation rates for those aged over 50 years tended to 
stabilise in the early 1980s and thus we do not expect this group to be a significant driver of 
the polarisation over the entire period. However, as is shown in Table A3 of Appendix 1, the 
employment rate for males over 50 years did fall between the 1982 and 1986 surveys prior to 
stabilising and thus will be a contributing factor in the combined predicted rate however when 
looking at age as an individual component, this is outweighed by increases in female 
employment rates.  
No doubt if we had more detail on certain variables, particularly with regards to education, a 
larger portion of the observed polarisation could be explained. For instance if we could 
differentiate between those not completing secondary school with those who do, the poor 
employment rates for the former group is likely to explain part of the polarisation. However, 
the available information on education is limited and we cannot observe those not completing 
secondary school. Also, the association of micro-locational factors with the incidence of 
joblessness was highlighted in Hunter (1995) and Gregory and Hunter (1995). Here the 
authors found that there had been an increase in the economic polarisation within our cities 
with low socio-economic status areas characterised by job loss and income falls and high 
socio-economic status areas characterised by job growth and income rises. Gregory and 
Hunter (1995) showed that within major cities, two-job families were congregating together in 
areas of high socio-economic status, especially in areas where manufacturing workers used to 
live. On a geographical basis families were found to be polarising into neighbourhoods of 
double-income earner or no-income earner families. Geographic polarisation that is within-
city such as that described by Gregory and Hunter, is best seen as a mixture of cause and 
effect of employment polarisation across households. Jobless households will be naturally 
sorted into more deprived neighbourhoods but also declining local employment opportunities 
will also reinforce this process. Unfortunately however, finer disaggregation of this data to 
capture micro-locational factors is not possible. 
  25As before we can repeat this conditioning for each household size. Tables 11-13 undertake 
this operation.  
Table 11: Comparison of actual vs. predicted jobless household rates for 1 adult 
households, 1982 to 1997/98 
   Predicted jobless household rate 













1982  35.1  29.6  28.0 32.1 28.6 29.6 29.5 29.6 30.1 
1986  37.9  28.1  26.7 30.7 27.5 28.1  Na  28.0 28.9 
1990  36.2  25.8  25.4 28.2 25.5 25.8 25.8 25.7 27.7 
1994  33.5  26.9  26.2 28.3 26.6 27.0 26.9 26.9 27.1 
1995  33.0  25.7  25.1 26.5 25.0 25.8 25.7 25.6 25.3 
1996  37.1  27.2  26.8 28.3 26.8 27.2 27.3 27.1 27.8 
1997  34.5  26.3  25.6 27.2 26.2 26.3 26.3 26.1 26.3 
∆ 97/98-82  -0.6  -3.3  -2.4 -4.9 -2.4 -3.3 -3.2 -3.5 -3.8 
Table 12: Comparison of actual vs. predicted jobless household rates for 2 adult 
households, 1982 to 1997/98 
   Predicted jobless household rate 













1982  8.4  8.7  7.1 8.8 8.5 8.8 8.8 8.8 6.6 
1986  8.9  7.9  6.8 8.0 7.7 7.9 n.a. 7.9 6.4 
1990  8.6  6.7  5.9 6.5 6.5 6.7 6.7 6.7 5.6 
1994  10.3  7.3  6.5 7.3 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.3 6.3 
1995  9.0  6.6  6.1 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.0 
1996  9.8  7.4  6.8 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.5 6.6 
1997  10.2  6.9  6.4 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 6.4 
∆ 97/98-82  1.8  -1.8  -0.7 -2.0 -1.6 -1.9 -1.8 -1.8 -0.2 
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Table 13: Comparison of actual vs. predicted jobless household rates for 3+ adult 
households, 1982 to 1997/98 
   Predicted jobless household rate 













1982  3.8  2.0  1.5 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 
1986  3.5  1.7  1.4 1.9 2.2 1.7 na 1.7 1.8 
1990  3.5  1.3  1.1 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 
1994  4.3  1.5  1.2 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 
1995  3.6  1.3  1.1 1.5 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 
1996  4.7  1.5  1.3 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 
1997  3.6  1.4  1.2 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 
∆ 97/98-82  -0.2  -0.6  -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.1 
 
For single-adult households conditioning on characteristics makes little difference and, if 
anything, suggests that characteristics of singles have moved over time to make them more 
employable. Age is the dominant change here with singles now being somewhat more likely 
to be of prime age. So the conditional polarisation for one-adult households is higher than the 
unconditional at around 3.2 percentage points rather than 2.7 points.  
In contrast, conditioning on characteristics for couples makes a significant difference back in 
1982. It suggests that there should have been fewer jobless couples in 1982 if the gender mix 
of employment is taken into consideration. Especially when gender mix is considered along 
with other characteristics. Over time the unwinding of the stark gender differences means that 
the conditional predicted jobless household rate is very similar in 1997 as 1982, whereas the 
unconditional has a marked decline due to rising employment levels. Hence characteristics of 
couples have moved to make them more likely to be jobless. So the conditional polarisation 
for couple households is around 2 percentage points. After conditioning the small three-plus-
adult household type shows no polarisation. So the process of conditioning suggests that 
singles are doing worse than in the raw polarisation measure and conditional polarisation is 
less acute for couples.  
  27We can repeat the within and between-household decomposition, such as in Table 6, on our 
measure of conditional polarisation. Figure 5 provides a summary of the decompositions of 
conditional polarisation.  
Figure 5: Decompositions of predicted jobless household rates and polarisation allowing 
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The top of the diagram presents a summary of the actual and predicted jobless household rates 
between the start and end period of our analysis, and also presents our measure of conditional 
polarisation, which is the difference between the actual jobless household rate and the 
conditional predicted jobless household rate. Immediately below the measure of conditional 
polarisation are the results of the decomposition into the portion of polarisation attributed to 
the between-household type component and the within-household type component. The 
numbers in brackets refer to the contribution of each component in percentage terms. As in 
Figure 3, the relative contribution each household type has on the polarisation found within-
household types, is presented at the bottom of the figure. Here we see that even after 
conditioning, the vast majority of the residual polarisation (77%) remains within-household 
types. And, yet again, the bulk of this within-household type rise affects couples (60%), so 
taken together around half of the 2.3 point total rise in conditional polarisation derives from 
among couples. 
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In summary, shifts in the patterns of employment toward the better educated, the prime-aged 
and women can explain about one third of the observed unconditional polarisation. Thus, two 
thirds of the initial polarisation based on randomly distributed employment, cannot be 
explained by the observed characteristics of household members and this is most marked 
among couples. So far we have explored the major characteristics by which employment 
varies across society. We now go further and explore whether this observed conditional 
polarisation varies by family circumstances that may be more clearly affecting labour supply. 
In particular we might anticipate the increase in conditional polarisation for one-adult 
households stems from the increasing number of lone parents who have traditionally low 
employment rates. 
5.  Households with children and renters 
In this section we explore employment polarisation for households with children and 
households renting further. Financial incentives to enter into paid employment facing 
households with children and those renting privately differ widely from other household 
types. Lone parents are obviously exposed to additional constraints in offering labour supply, 
as they are often the sole carers of their children. However, it is also the case that for couple 
households, when interactions between the tax system and the social security system are taken 
into consideration, couples with children can face substantial disincentives from one member 
entering into low paid, insecure work, and often it only pays if both adults enter the labour 
force. This is even more pronounced if one takes into consideration the costs associated with 
employment, such as travel costs, and the loss of non-cash benefits such as concessions to 
utilities and transport etc. Residing in rental accommodation may act as a proxy for 
individuals with low lifetime earnings potential. Also, families renting privately may be 
entitled to Rent Assistance and thus face differing financial incentives to enter employment 
than other families. Either way they have poorer incentives (lower potential wages and 
slightly higher benefits). 
Households with children 
As households with children face different incentives to enter the labour market, and Australia 
has one of the highest jobless household rates in the OECD, this part of the analysis focuses 
  29on households with children. Table 14 reports the actual jobless household rate, our 
unconditional measure of polarisation and our conditional measure of polarisation by 
household size and the presence of children in 1982, 1990 and 1997/98 with the final rows 
presenting the change over the period. 
Table 14: Unconditional and conditional polarisation within households by presence of 
children 
    1 adult    2 adult    3 adult   
    Kids  No kids Kids  No kids Kids  No kids
1982 Actual  58.2  29.9  6.5  11.8  5.1  2.5 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation 28.6  0.3 -2.2 3.0 3.2  0.5 
 
Conditional 
polarisation 16.2  2.5 1.6 2.5 3.7  0.7 
              
1990 Actual  50.8  31.2  6.6  12.0  5.5  2.1 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation  25.0 5.4  -0.1  5.4 4.2 0.9 
 
Conditional 
polarisation 18.9  5.0 2.5 3.9 4.2  0.6 
              
1997/98 Actual  49.2  29.6  8.9  12.0  3.6  3.5 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation  22.9 3.3 2.0 5.1 2.1 2.2 
 
Conditional 
polarisation  19.5 4.4 3.9 3.5 2.1 1.8 
              
∆ 1997/98-82  Actual -9.0  -0.3  2.4  0.2  -1.5  1.0 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation -5.8  2.9 4.2 2.1 -1.1 1.7 
 
Conditional 
polarisation 3.3  1.9 2.4 1.1  -1.6  1.2 
So for instance, the actual jobless household rate for a one-adult household with dependent 
children in 1980 was 58.2, polarisation based on a benchmark world of randomly distributed 
employment was 28.6, and any residual polarisation not explained by varying individual 
characteristics was 16.2. By 1997/98 the actual jobless household rate for single-adult 
households with children had fallen by 9 percentage points to 49.2, unconditional polarisation 
had fallen by 5.8 points to 22.9 and conditional polarisation had risen by 3.3 points to 19.5.  
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The key feature of this table is the large increase in conditional, or unexplained, polarisation 
in one and two-adult households with children. These are emphasised in Figure 6.  
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Figures A3 and A4 in Appendix 5 present the decompositions of unconditional and 
conditional polarisation respectively, furthering the disaggregation of household type to 
included both household size and presence of children. From these decompositions we see 
that unconditional polarisation, based on the benchmark of randomly distributed employment, 
is heavily focused on couples with children (65% of the total change in unconditional 
polarisation within-households is driven by couples with children whereas for lone parents 
unconditional polarisation fell sharply). Conditioning on changes in employment across key 
characteristics shifts the emphasis toward lone parents. In 1982 lone parents deviated quite 
substantially from the average employment rate, but by much less if other similar women are 
used as a comparison benchmark. Since then lone parents have gained ground in terms of 
employment against the average working age person, but lost ground relative to other women 
with the same observable characteristics. In absolute terms, the change in conditional 
polarisation is the greatest for lone parents. However, as couples with children represent a 
much larger group in the population, the 2.4 point increase in conditional polarisation for two-
adult households with children accounts for 53% of the total change in conditional 
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polarisation has also risen for single adults and couples without children to a smaller degree. 
The increasingly adverse situation of couples with children occurs right throughout the period, 
although our sample period stops before the recent welfare reform process has had any chance 
of a noticeable impact. For lone parents and single/couples without children the conditional 
polarisation stabilises in 1990.  
Therefore, allowing for the presence of children suggests that more of the 3.3 point increase in 
unconditional polarisation comes about through movements between-household types, 
especially toward more lone parents. However, employment rates of lone parents have risen 
by around 9 percentage points over this period. The striking thing about allowing for the 
presence of children is the poor employment performance of couples with children. 
This is in line with the findings of Gregory (1999) that couple families with children have 
become much more prone to joblessness over the last two decades. With falling male 
employment rates matched by a growth in female employment, Gregory shows that over 
ninety per cent of the increase in female employment in couple families with children 
between 1979 and 1998 went to families where the male was already in employment. Our 
results also reinforce Miller’s (1997) finding that couple families with young dependents are 
particularly prone to unemployment. Gregory and Hunter (1996) show that there is a 
geographical dimension to this with two-job families within major cities congregating 
together into areas of high socio-economic status and no-job families grouping together into 
areas of low socio-economic status, especially in areas formerly reliant on manufacturing.  
Households renting 
Another dimension by which work incentives are affected over this period is renting. Renters, 
except those in public housing, can receive Rent Assistance in addition to their basic income 
support payment, which is withdrawn as incomes rise after other income support payments 
have ended. The reforms implemented in July 2000, with more generous family payments and 
their slower withdrawal, mean that renters lose this support far further up the income 
distribution than before. Also, renting may act as a proxy for low lifetime earnings. Therefore, 
households in rental accommodation face different work incentives to other households in the 
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working-age population. Table 15 presents the equivalent to Table 14 for households renting 
rather than households with children.  
In Table 15 public housing units are excluded, as we do not have information on public 
housing for all of the years, so the numbers do not add up to the totals used before. Where we 
do observe public housing information, only around 5% of households are in public housing. 
In 1997/98 nearly 60% were jobless, which is not surprising, as households need to be in 
extreme financial hardship to qualify for public housing. Highlighted in the table is that 
renting couples have always been more prone to joblessness, even after conditioning for other 
observable characteristics. However, since then conditional polarisation between renters and 
non-renters has diverged ever more sharply. With both couples and singles in rented 
accommodation seeing sharp increases in joblessness for given characteristics. Figure 7 
presents the estimates of polarisation for households in private rental accommodation in 1982, 
1990 and 1997/98 and emphasises the jumps in polarisation for single and couple households. 
Over the period there has been little change in the share of households renting privately and 
other major characteristics have been conditioned on already. While it is probable renters 
have other unobserved characteristics against which there have been adverse shifts over this 
period, the results tend to imply that lower wages, poorer work records and worse financial 
incentives to work have had adverse consequences on households in the private rental sector.   
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  33Table 15: Unconditional and conditional polarisation within households by rent paid
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1982 Actual  25.0  36.7  9.3  7.1  7.4  2.3 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation -4.6  7.2  0.5 -1.7  5.3  0.4 
 
Conditional 
polarisation -2.4  6.5  3.2  0.5  5.9  0.6 
              
1990 Actual  25.8  34.2  11.6  6.6  6.8  2.5 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation -0.0  8.4  4.9 -0.0  5.5  1.1 
 
Conditional 
polarisation  1.4 6.5 6.3 1.1 5.5 1.0 
              
1997/98 Actual  28.2  29.2  14.5  7.5  7.3  2.6 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation  1.9 2.9 7.5 0.6 5.9 1.2 
 
Conditional 
polarisation 5.1  2.4 7.7 1.2  5.5  1.0 
              
∆ 1997/98-82  Actual 3.2  -7.5  5.2  0.4  -0.1  0.3 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation 6.5 -4.3 7.0 2.2  0.6  0.8 
 
Conditional 
polarisation 7.5 -4.1 4.5 0.7 -0.4 0.4 
 
6.  All-work and mix-work households 
Up until this point we have concentrated on measuring employment polarisation by looking at 
households with no employed adults. In this section we now turn to the full distribution of 
employment to examine households where all-adults are working (all-work households) and 
also households where at least one adult is working (mix-work households). In the same way 
that predicted jobless household rates were constructed, either assuming a random distribution 
of employment or allowing for employment changes within certain subgroups of the 
population, the full distribution of work can be predicted, thus allowing us to examine 
                                                 
6 Households in public housing have been excluded as they are such a small group in the population. 
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patterns of employment in mix-work and all-work households. Following our definition of the 
predicted jobless household rate in equation 2, the predicted allocation of work across 
households is, 
ˆˆˆ ˆ
(1 (1 ) ) (1 )
tt t t
i ii
i t t i tt t i tt ii i
Dist NoWork MixWork AllWork
sn s n n s n
=++
=+− − − +− ∑∑ ∑
i     (8) 
Using equation 8 we can alter our focus on the distribution of employment from no-work 
households, to all-work households at the opposite end of the household employment 
distribution. As employment and polarisation towards jobless households have both increased 
there must be a rise in the number of households with all-adults in work. As the polarisation 
measure is not linear (see Equation 3), polarisation that brings about more jobless households 
is not necessarily symmetrical with the share of households with all adults in work.  
All-work household rates and the associated measures of polarisation are presented in Table 
16.  
Table 16: Actual and predicted all-work household rates 
 Actual  Predicted
1 Polarisation
1982 49.5  50.1  -0.6 
1986 53.6  53.4  0.2 
1990 58.3  56.8  1.5 
1994 58.2  55.8  2.4 
1995 60.3  58.1  2.3 
1996 57.4  55.8  1.6 
1997 59.4  57.3  2.1 
∆ 1997-82 9.9  7.2  2.7 
1)  Predicted rate calculated assuming randomly distributed employment. 
The first column shows the actual rate of working-age households where all adults are 
working, while the second column shows the predicted all-work household rate based on a 
random distribution of employment. Polarisation, presented in the final column, as in the 
jobless case, is the difference between the actual and predicted rates. In 1982 the predicted 
share of households with all adults in work and the actual share were almost identical. The 
growth in employment and move toward more single-adult households leads to a sharp 
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figure out stripped even this as the share of households with all adults in work rose by 10 
percentage points. Thus, our measure of polarisation implies that there are 2.7 percent more 
households with all adults in work in 1997 than in 1982, given employment rates and 
household composition.  
The relative importance of employment and changes in the structure of households to the 
increase in the predicted all-work households are our focus in Table 17.  
Table 17: Decomposition of all-work household rates 






















1982-1997/8 7.2  2.8  4.4  2.8  -1.1  3.9 
            
1982-1990 6.7  1.5  5.2  2.1  -0.6  2.7 
1990-1997/8 0.5  1.2  -0.7  0.6  -0.9  1.5 
The table suggests that changes in household composition have an effect with a similar order 
of magnitude to the total impact of polarisation. Also explored in the table are the relative 
contributions of between and within-household type effects on the increase in polarisation. 
Here, the between component is actually negative because there are moves toward more 
singles who had less employment than would have occurred if employment were distributed 
randomly. For single-adult households the polarisation measure for all-adult households is the 
exact opposite of that for jobless households. The first three columns of Table 18 show that 
singles suffered more from joblessness than would have been the case if employment were 
randomly distributed. Here the results for singles are the opposite of those in the previous 
section (columns 1-3 in Table 7). Thus, all of the rise in polarisation toward more households 
where all adults work occurs within multi-adult households.  
In 1982 there were just under 1% less couples were both adults worked than would be 
predicted from a random distribution of employment. By 1997 this had increased to 5% more 
such couples than would occur randomly. The small number of households with three or more 
adults has seen equally dramatic shifts towards all members working.  
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Table 18: Actual and predicted all-work household rates by household size, 1982 to 
1997/98 
  1 adult     2 adults    3 adults plus   
 Actual  Predicted
1 Polarisation Actual Predicted
1 Polarisation Actual Predicted
1 Polarisation
1982  64.9 70.4  -5.5  48.7 49.6  -0.9  36.2 30.9  5.3 
1986  62.0 71.9  -9.9  53.9 51.7  2.2  40.6 33.6  7.0 
1990  63.9 74.2  -10.3  59.2 55.1  4.1  46.5 37.4  9.2 
1994  66.5 73.1  -6.6  58.5 53.4  5.1  42.7 35.4  7.3 
1995  67.0 74.3  -7.3  61.6 55.2  6.4  42.5 37.3  5.2 
1996  62.9 72.8  -9.9  57.4 53.0  4.4  46.8 34.5  12.4 
1997  65.5 73.7  -8.2  59.2 54.3  4.9  48.3 36.3  12.1 
                
∆ 1997-82 0.6  3.3  -2.7  10.5  4.7  5.8  12.1  5.4  6.8 
2)  Predicted rate calculated assuming randomly distributed employment. 
Now we investigate whether this polarisation can be explained by observable characteristics. 
Following equation 7, we relax the random distribution of employment assumption and allow 
employment rates to vary across the same observable characteristics as were used in the 
jobless case, that is; gender, age, education, State, capital city, and recent arrivals. Tables 19 
and 20 explore the impact of conditioning on these characteristics on our measures of 
polarisation for two-adult and three-plus-adult households respectively.  
Table 19: Comparison of actual vs. predicted all-work household rates for 2 adult 
households, 1982 to 1997/98 
   Predicted all-work household rate 













1982 48.7  49.6  46.4  50.0  50.7  49.6  49.6  49.6  47.1 
1986 53.9  51.7  49.1  52.9  53.0  51.7    51.7  50.9 
1990 59.2  55.1  53.4  56.7  56.3  55.1  55.1  55.0  55.4 
1994/95 58.5  53.4  52.0  54.3  54.6  53.4  53.4  53.3  53.7 
1995/96 61.6  55.2  54.1  56.2  56.4  55.2  55.1  55.1  55.7 
1996/97 57.4  53.0  51.8  54.0  54.0  53.0  52.9  52.9  53.1 
1997/98 59.2  54.3  53.2  55.5  55.4  54.3  54.2  54.2  54.8 
∆ 97/98-82 10.5  4.7  6.8  5.5  4.7  4.7  4.6  4.6  7.7 
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households, 1982 to 1997/98 
   Predicted all-work household rate 













1982 36.2  30.9  30.2  31.5  29.0  30.9  31.0  30.9  28.8 
1986 40.6  33.6  33.0  33.1  31.0  33.6    33.6  30.5 
1990 46.5  37.4  37.1  36.1  34.8  37.4  37.4  37.5  34.6 
1994/95 42.7  35.4  35.3  35.1  32.9  35.4  35.5  35.4  33.0 
1995/96 42.5  37.3  37.3  36.2  34.5  37.4  37.6  37.5  34.5 
1996/97 46.8  34.5  34.5  33.5  32.7  34.4  34.9  34.6  33.1 
1997/98 48.3  36.3  36.2  34.9  34.3  36.2  36.7  36.4  34.9 
∆ 97/98-82 12.1  5.4  6.0  3.4  5.3  5.3  5.7  5.5  6.1 
The situation of singles is analogous but opposite to that in Table 11 in the previous section 
and thus is not presented separately. The share of couples where both adults work has risen by 
more than 10 percentage points. Higher rates of employment in the general economy can 
predict around 5 of those 10 points. So the rate of couples with both adults working over this 
period increases by nearly 6 percentage points more than is consistent with the aggregate 
increase in employment. The change in gender patterns of employment can explain a fair 
chunk of this, and taken together with age and other factors, the gap in actual and predicted 
rates is halved to 3 points. Conditioning on observable characteristics is however, far less 
important in explaining the large increase in employment among larger (three-plus-adult) 
households. 
In summary, there has been a sharp increase in the share of couples and larger family units 
where all adults work.  Even after conditioning on observable characteristics there is still a 
large unexplained increase in dual-earner couples. Turning to households with dependent 
children as presented in Table 21, this trend is the mirror image of the polarisation associated 
with jobless households. Along with the increase in couple households with children where no 
adult is working there has been a simultaneous increase in those where both adults work, even 
after taking account of observable characteristics. Decomposing the measure of conditional 
polarisation as we did in the jobless case, we find that couples with children account for 66% 
of the within-household type polarisation over this period whereas for couples without 
children it is just 10% (see Appendix 5, Table A8). 
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Table 21: Unconditional and conditional polarisation within households by presence of 
children 
    2 adult    3 adult   
    Kids  No kids Kids  No kids 
1982 Actual  42.9  58.6  34.5  37.7 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation  -6.8 9.0 4.0 6.5 
 
Conditional 
polarisation -5.4 13.4  5.8  8.8 
          
1990 Actual  57.5  61.9  43.9  48.4 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation 2.4  6.9  6.0 11.3 
 
Conditional 
polarisation -0.8 11.3  6.6  15.5 
          
1997/98 Actual  54.8  65.5  45.1  50.5 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation 0.5 11.2 7.9 14.8 
 
Conditional 
polarisation -2.4 14.1  8.9  16.4 
          
∆ 1997/98-82  Actual 11.9  6.9  10.6  12.8 
 
Unconditional 
polarisation 7.3  2.2  4.0  8.3 
 
Conditional 
polarisation  3.0 0.7 3.2 7.6 
 
7. Concluding  comments 
Over the last fifteen years or so Australia has seen rising employment, shifts toward smaller 
households and more households having no earned income. Using a benchmark model of how 
many households would be jobless if employment was randomly distributed across the 
working-age population we examine whether Australia has seen a move to a world where the 
available work has become polarised into households with either all adults in paid work or no 
adults in paid work. This paper has used the Income Distribution Surveys and the Surveys of 
Income and Housing Costs from 1982 to 1997/98 published by the ABS to measure the extent 
of the polarisation of employment and examine which groups in Australia are the most 
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work households) but with an emphasis on jobless households as they are of greater 
importance to policy makers. 
The shift in the composition of households towards more one-adult households, whose 
probability of being jobless is higher than for multi-adult households, has contributed 
substantially to this increase in jobless households. However, we have shown that 
employment growth over the years should have largely offset the effects of this household 
compositional shift. The diminishing numbers of jobless individuals have become 
concentrated in particular households. This increase in jobless households has been matched 
by more multi-adult households with two or more earners. Hence it is fair to say that there has 
been a marked polarisation of employment opportunities in Australia over this period. This 
polarisation against the benchmark of a random distribution of work has resulted in around 
3.3 percentage points more jobless households or around 170,000 extra largely poor and 
welfare dependent families. A large majority of the polarisation is within-household types and 
most of the increase in polarisation mainly falls on 2 adult (couple) households, especially 
with children.  
Relaxing the random distribution of employment assumption and allowing for varying 
employment rates across certain subgroups of the population shows that changing variation in 
employment across groups explains about a third of the increasing incidence of jobless 
households. We have found that employment differences across gender and education groups 
add the most explanatory power to our conditional polarisation measure. Our analysis 
suggests that less educated men are losing employment whilst better-educated women are 
gaining with these groups tending to live in different households. However, even after 
conditioning for characteristics there remains a large unexplained element. Exploring this 
further we have found that once the variation in employment across groups has been taken 
into account, polarisation is most adversely affecting families with children (couples and lone 
parent) and households renting privately.  
Alongside this has been a growth in all-work households. Employment growth over the period 
and a move toward more single-adult households leads to a predicted rise in all-work 
households, however the actual extent of the rise in the all-work household rate was quite a 
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significant amount higher than that predicted by these shifts. Polarisation has created a 
marked increase in dual-earner couples and again couples with children have seen largest 
increases. Hence taken together there has been a marked increase in the proportion of children 
living households with no earner and in those with two or more earners. 
It is important to note that the rise in jobless households happened in two rather different 
periods. The polarisation of employment primarily occurred in the 1980s whereas the changes 
in household composition predominantly occurred after 1990. Hence the employment gains 
made after the early 1980s recession made no dent in the number of welfare dependent 
families, in fact jobless families continued to rise. This was due to a failure for this 
employment to reach these jobless families. Whereas after 1990 the continued rise was due to 
shifts in household structure toward single-adult households where employment rates are low. 
This still begs the question as to why single-adult households (with or without children) have 
such low labour supply.  
Why might employment have become unevenly distributed into all-work or no-work 
households? A number of major changes have occurred over this period in the world of work. 
One of the most pertinent is the sharp rise in inequality of earnings. This saw real earnings fall 
for low waged men in the 1980s (See Borland, Gregory and Sheehan, 2001, for a discussion 
of this). This fall in real earnings was most pronounced at around the 25
th percentile of the 
distribution (see Appendix 2, Figure A1 for the patterns for weekly wages for male full-time 
earners from our data), so there was a substantial crushing of the wage distribution just above 
the minimum wage. By contrast there were sharp increases in earnings for the more educated, 
especially more educated women over this period. Men with low earnings potential and 
women with high earnings potential tend to live in different households. Our calculations after 
conditioning on gender and education show how changing employment patterns across these 
groups lies behind about one third of the observed polarisation (Appendix 1, Tables A3 and 
A4 highlight the differing employment trends between men and women over this period).  
This decline in less educated males earnings power coincided with increases in the 
replacement rates between incomes available when not working and those for taking a job at 
the minimum wage (see Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2000c). This figure is 
reproduced in Appendix 3, Figure A2. Indeed the conditional polarisation we observe falls 
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disincentives and constraints in taking low wage employment. Renting also proxies low 
earnings potential and aspects of geographic location, as highlighted by Gregory and Hunter 
(1995). However, the difference in relative incentives between the first earner taking a low 
wage job and those facing second earners remain marked particularly if one also takes into 
consideration various non-cash benefits which give social security recipients various 
concessions on pharmaceuticals, utilities and public transport. Australia (and the UK, the 
other country with very high jobless households with children) is unusual in having no 
earnings related element in welfare payments combined with an individualised tax system. 
This means that work incentives vary among the jobless according to family structure 
(whereas earnings related payments make these broadly flat) and individualised tax systems 
give strong incentives for second earners relative to first earners.  
The ongoing welfare reform process starting from around 1994 has addressed many of these 
issues. The separate treatment of partners with a partial individualisation of welfare payments; 
the Jobs, Education, Training (JET) programme designed to assist lone parents into re-
entering the labour force; and greater emphasis and monitoring of job search by the 
unemployed are the longest standing elements of reform. More recently, financial incentives 
for families with children, especially with child-care costs and a wider focus on motivating 
and helping all welfare recipients to find work are likely to reduce this problem after our 
period of study. In addition, we believe that improving basic education levels and reducing 
employer taxes on low-wage workers (France is having some success with this latter strategy 
recently) may provide useful support to these reforms. Over the next few years we should 
hopefully be able to assess whether this reform strategy has worked. 
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Appendix 1: Employment rates across subgroups of population 
Table A1: Aggregate employment rates, total and by gender, 1982 to 1997/98 
 Total  Male  Female 
1982 70.4  85.0  54.2 
1986 71.9  84.0  58.5 
1990 74.2  84.1  63.5 
1994/95 73.1 82.6 62.9 
1995/96 74.3 82.7 65.4 
1996/97 72.8 81.7 63.3 
1997/98 73.7 81.9 65.0 
 




25 to 34 
years 








1982  75.7 71.1 73.8 59.0 88.3 77.9 64.0 
1986  75.6 75.3 76.5 55.4 88.5 81.1 64.5 
1990  75.2 75.8 80.5 59.3 89.9 80.7 66.7 
1994/95  75.9 74.7 78.1 59.5 88.3 81.0 65.0 
1995/96  75.6 77.0 78.6 62.6 89.1 81.7 66.3 
1996/97  74.6 72.9 77.9 62.4 88.4 80.2 64.5 
1997/98  75.2 75.9 78.5 62.1 88.0 79.9 65.9 
 
Table A3: Male employment rates by age and educational qualification 







1982 82.3  90.3  91.8  72.8  92.9  87.8  81.6 
1986 82.0  92.8  90.8  65.7  94.4  89.3  78.2 
1990 81.1  91.1  90.9  68.0  94.9  87.4  78.6 
1994/95 80.7  89.0  89.5 66.8 92.8  87.2  76.2 
1995/96 80.6  89.5  88.4 68.9 93.3  87.3  76.1 
1996/97 78.6  88.3  88.1 68.5 92.8  86.5  74.7 
1997/98 80.2  87.4  88.8 68.1 93.2  84.9  76.0 
 
  45Table A4: Female employment rates by age and educational qualification, 1982 to 
1997/98 







1982  68.9 52.2 54.7  37.4  79.2  62.1  49.2 
1986  68.9 58.6 61.6  39.0  78.8  68.4  52.4 
1990  69.0 61.5 69.9  45.5  82.0  71.8  56.3 
1994/95  70.9 61.3 67.1  48.6  82.7  71.4  55.7 
1995/96  70.6 65.3 69.0  53.3  84.1  73.2  58.1 
1996/97  70.3 58.9 68.3  53.0  83.7  70.2  56.0 
1997/98  70.0 65.4 68.5  53.4  82.6  72.4  57.0 
 











1982  70.0  71.1 69.5 71.0  71.7  68.2 
1986  71.6  73.2 69.9 72.3 na  na 
1990  74.3  74.3 73.8 74.2  74.8  73.1 
1994/95  73.5  72.3 73.0 73.5  73.9  71.7 
1995/96  75.7  73.8 73.6 73.2  75.2  72.8 
1996/97  73.1  71.9 73.1 73.2  74.2  70.6 
1997/98  73.4  74.1 72.9 74.5  74.9  71.6 
 





1982 70.0  70.5 
1986 69.9  72.2 
1990 74.5  71.3 
1994/95 70.3  73.3 
1995/96 68.3  75.0 
1996/97 69.3  73.2 
1997/98 67.8  74.4 
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Appendix 2: Real wages  









1982 1986 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997
10th percentile 25th percentile 50th percentile 75th percentile 90th percentile
 
Appendix 3: Replacement rates 
Figure A2: Net Replacement Rates of income support versus minimum wage, various 
















































Single, no children Couple, 2 children Couple, no children  
Source: Reference Group on Welfare Reform (2000c), Appendix 4, p.50 
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Appendix 4: Decompositions of predicted jobless household rates and polarisation by household size and presence of children 











1982 12.7 11.5 1.2
1997/98 16.3 11.8 4.5

























(70.8%)   
1 adult 
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1982 12.7 11.5 10.2 2.5
1997/98 16.3 11.8 11.5 4.8









type   
  (27.8%) 
0.6  1.7 
(72.3%)   
 
1 adult 
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Appendix 5: Decompositions of predicted all-work household rates and polarisation  











1982 49.5 50.1 -0.6
1997/98 59.4 57.3 2.1


























   














           
            
          
    
    
      
    













1982 49.5 50.1 48.1 1.4
1997/98 59.4 57.3 57.4 2.1









type   
  (-193.8%) 
-1.2  1.9 
(293.8%)  
 
1 adult  2 adult 
 
3+ adult
  (-41.1%) 






       
   
                 
                   
               
 
   
  
   
      
      










1982 49.5 50.1 -0.6
1997/98 59.4 57.3 2.1
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1982 49.5 50.1 48.1 1.4
1997/98 59.4 57.3 57.4 2.1









type   
  (-157.8%) 

















  (-10.8%) 










    
 